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Abstract

In March of 2010, renowned architect Frank Gehry unveiled his design for a memorial to Dwight D.
Eisenhower in Washington, D.C. Centered around an elaborate layout of stone blocks running along a cityblock of Maryland Avenue is the featured aspect of Gehry‘s design: a narrative tapestry of scenes from
Eisenhower‘s life. Over seven stories tall, the tapestry will impede the view of the building located directly
behind it. That building is the Department of Education, named for Lyndon Johnson.1 Decades after two of
the greatest political titans of the twentieth century had passed away, their legacies were still in competition. In
many ways, then, it is fitting that, as a great monument will be laid for Dwight Eisenhower in the nation’s
capitol, scholars have begun reassessing him as a leader and a president. One aspect of his presidency that has
needed to be reevaluated is his fascinating relationship with Johnson. They came from different political
parties and had different visions for America, yet there was a time when circumstances bound them in a
meaningful, though unstable, political dynamic. For six years of his presidency, the moderate Republican
Eisenhower had to work constructively with a Congress dominated by Democrats in order to get his agenda
passed. As Majority Leader of the United States Senate during this period, Johnson saw an opportunity to
raise the standing of the Democratic Party and his own ambitions for the presidency by aligning himself with,
and occasionally undermining, President Eisenhower. Although neither man fully achieved his goals in this
partnership, it nevertheless proved fruitful for both. Their interaction sheds light on them as individuals and
leaders. Further, a closer inspection of many legislative triumphs previously credited to Johnson actually
contained the artful influence of President Eisenhower, proving his political prowess applied to Johnson and
the legislative process.
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The Master of the Senate and the
Presidential Hidden Hand: Eisenhower,
Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the 1950s
by Samuel J. Cooper-Wall
In March of 2010, renowned architect Frank
Gehry unveiled his design for a memorial to Dwight
D. Eisenhower in Washington, D.C. Centered
around an elaborate layout of stone blocks running
along a city-block of Maryland Avenue is the
featured aspect of Gehry‘s design: a narrative
tapestry of scenes from Eisenhower‘s life. Over
seven stories tall, the tapestry will impede the view
of the building located directly behind it. That
building is the Department of Education, named for
Lyndon Johnson.1 Decades after two of the greatest
political titans of the twentieth century had passed

1

Philip Kennicott, ―A New Wrinkle: Gehry‘s
Eisenhower Memorial is Bold but not Curvy,‖ The
Washington Post, March 26, 2010, C1.
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away, their legacies were still in competition. In
many ways, then, it is fitting that, as a great
monument will be laid for Dwight Eisenhower in
the nation‘s capitol, scholars have begun
reassessing him as a leader and a president. One
aspect of his presidency that has needed to be
reevaluated is his fascinating relationship with
Johnson. They came from different political parties
and had different visions for America, yet there was
a time when circumstances bound them in a
meaningful, though unstable, political dynamic. For
six years of his presidency, the moderate
Republican Eisenhower had to work constructively
with a Congress dominated by Democrats in order
to get his agenda passed. As Majority Leader of the
United States Senate during this period, Johnson
saw an opportunity to raise the standing of the
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Democratic Party and his own ambitions for the
presidency by aligning himself with, and
occasionally undermining, President Eisenhower.
Although neither man fully achieved his goals in
this partnership, it nevertheless proved fruitful for
both. Their interaction sheds light on them as
individuals and leaders. Further, a closer inspection
of many legislative triumphs previously credited to
Johnson actually contained the artful influence of
President Eisenhower, proving his political prowess
applied to Johnson and the legislative process.
Paths to Power and Finding Common Ground
In many ways, the dynamic between these
two men took shape at their very first meeting. Two
weeks after Nazi Germany surrendered to the allies,
Texas Congressman Lyndon B. Johnson received
permission to take one of his small subcommittees
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to Europe. Although his travel was under the guise
of making an evaluation about how the U.S. Navy
could help support a strong postwar defense effort,
Johnson was most anxious to view conditions on the
ground in Europe in order to enhance his credentials
for taking part in postwar planning. Although
Commanding General Dwight D. Eisenhower‘s
staff complained about the timing of Johnson‘s
visit, Eisenhower himself nevertheless charmed
Johnson and his colleagues by briefing them about
conditions in Europe. He also instructed his aides to
allow Johnson‘s delegation to go wherever they
desired and to ensure that they had ―a very pleasant
and wonderful visit.‖2 Johnson benefitted politically
from the visit, while Eisenhower dutifully and

2

Robert Dallek, Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson
and His Times, 1908-1960 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991), 269-270.
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quietly satisfied any obligation he had to those
public servants. Although neither man could have
realized it at the time, this encounter foreshadowed
a future relationship.
Seven years later Johnson and Eisenhower were
reunited in the political realm. The election of 1952
saw Eisenhower win the presidency with the largest
margin of victory since the landslides of Franklin D.
Roosevelt. His popularity, dating to World War II,
made him a political star. The Republicans also
regained a two-seat majority in the Senate. One of
the Democratic casualties that year was Majority
Leader Ernest McFarland of Arizona. McFarland‘s
defeat meant his assistant leader, Lyndon Johnson,
who had only been in the Senate for four years, was
now the highest ranking man in the Democratic
caucus. Despite his inexperience, Johnson began
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campaigning among his colleagues to be the new
Minority Leader for the 1953 session of Congress.
With the support of influential Georgia Senator
Richard Russell, Johnson got the job; though, at that
time, there was little competition for the leadership
of Senate Democrats.3 The last two occupants of the
position had been defeated for reelection while
trying to defend the increasingly unpopular policies
of President Harry S. Truman. However, Johnson
sensed a new opportunity with a popular
Republican now in the White House: if Democrats
could align themselves with Eisenhower wherever
possible, they stood to benefit from his massive
appeal - an approach seemingly verified by the
Democratic triumphs in the 1954 midterm elections,

3

On January 2, 1953, Democrats elected the fortyfour year old Johnson to be the youngest party leader in the
history of the Senate. Ibid., 422-425.
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which made Johnson Senate Majority Leader.4 As a
result of this mindset, Johnson took pride in

4

Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson:
Master of the Senate (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002),
521. Interestingly, Eisenhower during this time was extending
his political influence across the country, even to Lyndon
Johnson‘s own reelection campaign. The Texas Republican
Party, led by Jack Porter, Johnson‘s opponent in 1948, was
seeking a candidate capable of using Eisenhower‘s coattails to
overpower the Democratic leader, a strategy Eisenhower
applauded and encouraged. See Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 439.
The President, though, did not take an active role in the
campaign, but behind-the-scenes he ordered executive
agencies to ―step up expenditures to stimulate industrial
activity‖ in hopes that might make a difference by the time of
the election. By October, though, polls showed the
Republicans were vulnerable, so Eisenhower undertook a tenthousand mile campaign tour. Along the way, Eisenhower
declared that if the Democrats retook control of Congress,
they would start ―a Cold War of partisan politics.‖ See Dallek,
Lone Star Rising, 460. Johnson and House Democratic Leader
Sam Rayburn took offense, sending the President a telegram
calling his remarks an ―unjust attack on the many Democrats
who have done so much to cooperate with him and the
Administration and to defend his program from attacks by
members and leaders of his own party.‖ They also declared
that, as far as they were concerned, no partisan war would
occur if the Democrats retook control of Congress and that
they would continue to support an ―enlightened foreign policy
against the Republican reactionaries . . .‖ See Lyndon B.
Johnson and Samuel Rayburn to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 9
October 1954, White House Central File, Alphabetical Series,
Box 1599, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
Regardless of whatever their motives were, Johnson and
Rayburn did have a point. And this telegram was not the only
example of Johnson trying to prove his intentions and abilities

162

supporting aspects of Eisenhower‘s agenda,
especially foreign policy.5 One example was

to the President; during a 1957 breakfast meeting with
Eisenhower, Johnson presented him with papers which
demonstrated that the current 85th Congressional session had
spent far more time in session and passed more legislation
compared to the Republican-controlled 83rd Congress.
Eisenhower‘s secretary, Ann Whitman, noted in a
memorandum on the matter that ―The Senator is sensitive,
apparently, in this respect.‖ See Ann C. Whitman,
Memorandum of Appointment, 26 August 1957, Ann
Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, Dwight D.
Eisenhower Presidential Library.
5
In 1965, Johnson recounted his intentions towards
Eisenhower to the newly elected House of Representatives
Republican leader, Gerald Ford. Johnson said he told
Eisenhower, ―Mr. President, when I agree with you, I‘ll come
tell you. I‘ll disagree with you with dignity and decency, and I
won‘t talk about your dog or your boy. But I‘ll try to offer an
alternative . . .‖ Later in his conversation with Ford, Johnson
claimed to have never had a quarrelsome word with
Eisenhower for six years. While Johnson romanticized his
relationship with Eisenhower, this attitude reflected Johnson‘s
desire for a partnership. See Michael Beschloss, Reaching for
Glory: Lyndon Johnson’s Secret White House Tapes (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 165. In his conversations
with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, there is strong
evidence of Johnson‘s desire to cooperate. The two met on
occasion and extended great courtesy to each other as they
exchanged ideas, prompting Dulles to write the President after
one such chat, ―I had a very gratifying talk with Lyndon
Johnson. He came to see me just prior to leaving for Europe
this afternoon. It was not only marked by great personal
warmth but a sincere desire to help find a way to get bipartisan
backing for our foreign policies.‖ Dulles went on to reiterate
Johnson‘s assurance that if the administration would cooperate
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Johnson‘s quick approval of a measure granting
Eisenhower full authority to use the U.S. Armed
Forces in 1955 to defend Taiwanese islands around
Formosa from Chinese air attacks.6 Later, following
the 1956 election, foreign policy returned as a
forefront issue during the Suez Crisis, as Britain and
France launched an assault on the Egyptian military
on the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal. On
November 9, 1956, Eisenhower arranged to have
Congressional leaders briefed about conditions on
the Sinai, in hopes this would help get approval for
proposals which increased the chief executive‘s
authority to handle the American response to the
and counsel with himself and Democratic Senate Whip Mike
Mansfield, he was confident Eisenhower‘s policies would be
supported by most of the Democratic caucus. See John Foster
Dulles to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 13 November 1956, Ann
Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 8, DDEL.
6
This 1955 measure would later serve as Johnson‘s
inspiration for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964. See
Tom Wicker, Dwight D. Eisenhower (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 2002), 79.
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crisis. Eisenhower‘s plan worked perfectly, as
Johnson found the briefing ―very fruitful and
helpful‖ and promised he would not play politics
with foreign policy. By meeting face-to-face with
Democrats, Eisenhower assured Johnson and other
Senators that he was firmly in control of the
situation.7 Johnson also supported Eisenhower‘s
―open skies‖ proposal, calling the plan for the
superpowers to be able to fly over each other‘s
nations to observe nuclear armament facilities an
―imaginative stroke.‖ Johnson further recommended
an ―open curtain‖ policy, which encouraged the free
movement of people and ideas between the
communist and democratic areas of the world

7

Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis
of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1995), 137.
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without being subjected to suspicion.8 Soon after, as
Johnson lay in a hospital recovering from his first
heart attack, Eisenhower thanked him for this
support, writing, ―Thank you ever so much. I am
greatly pleased by what you had to say. I do hope
you are rapidly improving.‖9 This gracious and
respectful tone found in their early correspondence
was symbolic of their meaningful efforts to
cooperate on critical foreign policy issues in the
first years of the Eisenhower Administration.
Johnson‘s alignment with the President was
necessitated by the latter‘s obvious popularity, still
strong even a decade after World War II ended. As

8

Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point:
Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 470.
9
Galambos and Van Ee, Dwight D. Eisenhower to
Lyndon B. Johnson, The Presidential Papers of Dwight D.
Eisenhower,
http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/firstterm/documents/1531.cfm.
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long as Eisenhower was doing well in the polls,
Johnson was likely to support him. As Eisenhower‘s
reelection approached in 1956, Johnson‘s support
for the President was remarkably nonpartisan in
nature. In fact, Johnson was careful to avoid
criticizing the President, because, as Doris Kearns
wrote, ―Johnson felt that to attack Eisenhower
would be ‗like telling children that their father was
a bad man . . . ‘‖10 Johnson took specific action to
appease the President, including allocating an
additional five million dollars for the Overseas
Information Program after Eisenhower placed a call
to him on the matter in May of 1956.11 With such
action, Johnson‘s standing with Eisenhower grew.
10

Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American
Dream (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 155.
11
According to South Dakota Senator Karl Mundt,
Johnson had intended to support a cut of the OIP budget prior
to Eisenhower‘s request to the contrary. Karl Mundt to Dwight
D. Eisenhower, White House Central Files, Alphabetical File,
Box 1599, DDEL.
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As the campaign of 1956 neared, Eisenhower even
believed the Democrats might nominate Johnson to
run against him. In his memoirs, Eisenhower
observed that Johnson would have ―. . . had better
vote-getting power‖ than the actual nominee, Adlai
Stevenson.12 For his part, Johnson viewed the
President‘s reelection as inevitable. Sid Richardson
reported to Eisenhower on November 8th that
Johnson had told him that ―The President is going
to carry Texas . . . and I am going to continue to
work with him.‖13 Eisenhower not only carried
Texas, but won in a landslide greater than that of his
first campaign. However, the close cooperation
between the two politicians had already reached its
12

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Waging Peace: The White
House Years 1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday & Company,
Inc., 1965), 11.
13
Galambos and Van Ee, Sid Richardson to Dwight
D. Eisenhower, The Presidential Papers of Dwight D.
Eisenhower: The Middle Way, Vol. 17 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2001), 2376.
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apex. Johnson‘s biographer Robert Dallek explained
that in Eisenhower‘s second term, ―Johnson was
reluctant to abandon the bipartisanship that he
believed had served the country and congressional
Democrats during Ike‘s first term. But pressure
from liberals, a defense of congressional
prerogatives, and genuine differences over Middle
East policy pushed him into a conflict with Ike,‖
and the result was Johnson‘s allegiance to
Eisenhower waning over the rest of the decade.14
For the Democratic leader, this strategy appeared
quite wise, but what he had failed to anticipate, and
what some scholars have failed to grasp, was how
Eisenhower in turn used Johnson to his own
political advantage.
Eisenhower‘s Approach to Johnson and Congress
14

Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 511.
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In order to more fully understand this
dynamic, historiographical conclusions must be
analyzed and reevaluated. Chief among them is the
perception of President Eisenhower as ―. . . an aging
hero who reigned more than he ruled and lacked the
energy, motivation, and political know-how to have
a significant impact on events.‖15 Originally the
view of cynical liberals in the 1950s, it had made its
way into early historical analysis of Eisenhower and
public perception about the President. Modern
scholars, such as Fred Greenstein, have discovered
that Eisenhower was a far more devious and clever
strategist than his critics had assumed. In fact, he
employed a shrewd ―hidden-hand‖ methodology
which concealed a great deal of his leadership

15

Fred Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency:
Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982),
5.
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initiatives while enabling him room to maneuver
within the political system.16 Akin to many aspects
of his presidency, Eisenhower‘s interactions with
Congress typically invoked a philosophy derived
from this hidden-hand style of leadership. It was a
multi-faceted approach that, interestingly enough,
had a similar concept as that of an extensive study
written by Democratic attorney James Rowe for

16

Ibid., 5-6. Yet, while the ―hidden-hand‖ strategy
proved effective for Eisenhower, it also allowed for others to
portray him as a weak leader. Lyndon Johnson, on the
contrary, exercised his power overtly and commandingly.
Known as the ―master of the Senate,‖ Johnson‘s leadership
strategies have become part of Senate lore. He knew how to
count and gather votes, and was capable of intimidating,
threatening, bribing, cajoling, amusing, or flattering in order to
wrangle support. His biographer Robert Caro wrote, ―He used
the powers he found and the powers he created with a raw,
elemental brutality.‖ Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson, xxi.
Eisenhower, though, saw through the Senate Democratic
leader. Eisenhower‘s friend William E. Robinson remembered
the President, while watching the 1960 Democratic
Convention, saying of Johnson, ―He is a small man. He hasn‘t
got the depth of mind nor the breadth of vision to carry great
responsibility. Any floor leader of a Senate majority party
looks good, no matter how incompetent he may be. Johnson is
superficial and opportunistic.‖ Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand
Presidency, 28.
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Harry Truman after the Republican Party won both
houses of Congress in the 1946 midterm elections.
Rowe‘s report ended up in Eisenhower‘s White
House files after Truman left office, though there is
no evidence that Eisenhower himself ever read it.
That said, many of Rowe‘s recommendations were
also part of Eisenhower‘s strategy and it serves as a
valuable lens for further examining the tactics of
President Eisenhower.
Rowe laid out historical precedents for his
conclusions concerning the success of Presidential
dealings with Congress. He noted that Presidents
such as Grover Cleveland and William Howard Taft
tended not to vocally berate Congressional
opposition, since this kind of behavior often harmed
the President and his reputation more than his
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targets.17 Eisenhower avoided such confrontations
by limiting his criticism of Congress in public.
Rarely did an intense disagreement between
Eisenhower and Johnson become news or public
knowledge. Eisenhower‘s kindness and diplomacy
shown in many interactions with Johnson certainly
signaled a legitimate feeling that the President
preferred Johnson as a friend, not an enemy.18 This

17

James Rowe, ―Cooperation or Conflict: The
President‘s relationships with an opposition Congress‖, White
House Central Files, Permanent File, Box 2, DDEL, 3.
18
The formal correspondence between the two was
almost always kind, if not warm, in nature. This is especially
true for the summer of 1955, when both Johnson and then
Eisenhower were stricken with heart attacks. After hearing of
Eisenhower‘s health troubles, Johnson wrote to the President
expressing a strong desire to continue to cooperate with him.
The President‘s Chief of Staff, Sherman Adams, replied to
Johnson, writing that the letter was ―. . . very pleasing to
[Eisenhower]. He asks me to say that he echoes your desire
that there be fullest cooperation between the leaders of the
Congress and the administration on every matter important to
the welfare and safety of our country.‖ See Sherman Adams to
Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 October 1955, White House Central
Files, the President‘s Personal File, Box 973, DDEL. Wilton
Persons, Eisenhower‘s Congressional liaison aide, latter
recalled that their respective heart problems brought
Eisenhower and Johnson closer together, ―They belonged to
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attitude was very much unlike Herbert Hoover, for
example, who became so ―publicly argumentative‖
with Congress that it approved little of his agenda.
To ease or prevent tension, Rowe viewed personal
meetings with opposition leaders as significant
gestures toward cooperation. Indeed, scheduling
records indicate that Eisenhower occasionally
breakfasted with the Senate Democratic leader and
regularly invited Johnson and House Speaker Sam
Rayburn to private evening meetings at the White
House. Rowe also recommended that the President
should ―act and speak at all times in terms of public
welfare and not as partisan.‖19 The Congress would
be more likely to support the President whenever he
has popular support on his side. According to Rowe,

the same cub, so to speak.‖ See Wilton B. Persons Oral
History, OH #334, DDEL.
19
Rowe, ―Cooperation or Conflict,‖ 25.
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―The history of every administration shows that in
the final analysis a President has but one weapon:
public opinion.‖20 Eisenhower was accustomed to
this practice as well, partially because he knew his
intentions far better than those of many
Congressmen. As Eisenhower once confided to
friend Edward ―Swede‖ Hazlett, ―In the general
case each [member of Congress] thinks of himself
as intensely patriotic; but it does not take the
average member long to conclude that his first duty
to his country is to get himself re-elected.‖21
Eisenhower accused Johnson and others of such
pettiness, but was fortunate that he himself had a
degree of popularity which left little doubt to his
reelection. Although he was never able to bring
20

Ibid., 5.
Dwight D. Eisenhower to Edward E. Hazlett, 22
July 1957, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 5,
DDEL.
21
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Republican majorities back into either house
following their loss of power in the 1954 midterms,
Eisenhower proved capable of working with
Johnson and the Democratic Congress.
Another significant method Eisenhower
employed specifically on Johnson was the use of
intermediaries. Some were congressional allies,
who kept tabs on the Senate Democratic leader.
This was one assignment in which Republican
leader William Knowland, who did not often hold
the confidence of the President, was particularly
useful. With his desk on the Senate floor right
across the center aisle from Johnson, Knowland was
ideally situated to be able to gather some
information to pass along to Eisenhower, including
a possible rift between Johnson and his mentor,

176

Sam Rayburn, in 1957.22 Two specific men, though,
managed the job best. In the early days of the
presidency, the primary go-between was Sid
Richardson. The Texas millionaire made his fortune
in oil, and he and Eisenhower had been friends for
over twenty years. He also was a financial
contributor to both the President and Johnson,
making him the ideal person to discreetly handle
Johnson on Eisenhower‘s behalf. Eisenhower, with
counsel from Treasury Secretary George
Humphrey, used Richardson to encourage Johnson
to support the administration‘s policy wherever
possible. In one instance Eisenhower had a hand in
plans to suggest Richardson threaten support for a
primary election challenge to Johnson from Texas
Governor Allen Shivers in 1954 unless the
22

Ann C. Whitman Diary, 29 August 1957, Ann
Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, DDEL.
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Democratic leader got on board with certain
Eisenhower policies.23
After Richardson‘s death in 1959,
Eisenhower‘s second Treasury Secretary, Robert
Anderson, another Texan, stepped in to the role.
When reflecting on this experience in a letter to
Johnson several months after Eisenhower‘s death,
Anderson recalled that this liaison was established
―. . . on the basis of preserving completely the
[Democratic] party integrity and the absolute right
of dissent, but so that we did not confront either the
Administration or the Congressional leadership with
surprise suggestions which might not be in our
national interest either politically or economically.‖
Anderson also remembered that the information
23

Shivers and Johnson had one of the greatest
rivalries in Texas politics, mainly due to Shiver‘s bucking of
the Democrats in 1952 to support Eisenhower. Greenstein, The
Hidden-Hand Presidency, 59-60.
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discussed by the President or Johnson with him
would be kept confidential from the cabinet, though
he did reserve the right to report anything Johnson
told him to Eisenhower. Lastly, Anderson
nostalgically noted the ―free exchange‖ of ideas
between them, and how their relationship was much
stronger than future presidents with Congressional
leaders, including John Kennedy‘s relationship with
Everett Dirksen, Johnson‘s with Dirksen (in the
1960s), or Nixon‘s with Congressional Democrats
in the early 1970s. Although Anderson may have
idealized the Eisenhower-Johnson relationship as he
wrote to his fellow Texan so many years after the
fact, he was certainly in a position to see the
cordiality and respect the two showed for each
other.24
24

Robert B. Anderson to Lyndon B. Johnson, 19
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The use of intermediaries was a creative
tactic on Eisenhower‘s part, but probably even more
effective were his more personal meetings with
Johnson, an approach highlighted in the Rowe
Report. Even when the Democrats were the
minority party in Congress, Eisenhower invited
Johnson and Rayburn to the White House to talk
policy and politics over drinks and light
refreshments. The three were comfortable talking
with each other in this setting and were able to bond
over the fact that they were all born Texans (though
Eisenhower was raised in Kansas).25 Most
importantly, these meetings surely allowed
March 1970, Anderson Papers, Box 344, DDEL. Anderson
also would periodically write summaries for Eisenhower about
Johnson‘s political stances on certain issues for the President‘s
use, even against other Democrats such as Richard Russell.
Robert B. Anderson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 30 December
1958, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 2,
DDEL.
25
Irwin Unger and Debi Unger, LBJ: A Life (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1999),168.
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Eisenhower to get a better sense of Johnson‘s
persona and character, and thus allowing him to
more easily take the pulse of his so-called ―loyal
opposition‖ in Congress.26
Overall, these tactics proved essential for
Eisenhower over the six year period in which the
President and the powerful Majority Leader worked
to guide the legislative process. Johnson was
obsessed with public approval and press attention.
Eisenhower understood Johnson‘s motives in this
regard, and privately referred to the Democratic

26

Johnson, on the other hand, fell victim to
somewhat underestimating Eisenhower. According to assistant
George Reedy, Johnson went so far as to think White House
Press Secretary James Hagerty was ― . . . responsible for the
esteem in which the nation held Eisenhower.‖ See George
Reedy, Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir (New York: Andrews
and McMeel, Inc., 1982), 67. Perhaps Johnson even had a
sense of his own self-superiority existed, if so it was enhanced
by his devoted staff. Foremost among them was Reedy, who
said in his memoir on Johnson that the Senate Majority Leader
was the most influential leader of the early 1950s, more so
than even Eisenhower. Ibid., xiii.
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leader as a ―phony.‖27 Eisenhower also displayed no
inclination to trust Johnson, as the Majority Leader
clearly wanted Eisenhower‘s job and would employ
devious political strategies to get it. Yet, no matter
the degree to which Eisenhower detested Johnson‘s
―superficial and opportunistic‖ qualities, the
President was aware of his own popularity and how
this could be used as leverage over the Senate
leader.28 It was also clear to Eisenhower that he
would need the help of Democrats to pass his
agenda, which was not conservative enough to suit
the Taft wing of the Republican Party. To achieve
Democratic support, Eisenhower treated Johnson
with great respect, even placing him on five-person

27

Wicker, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 134.
Eisenhower quoted by Arthur Krock. W.J.
Rorabaugh, The Real Making of the President: Kennedy,
Nixon, and the 1960 Election (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2009), 30.
28
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committee which would be tasked with determining
his (Eisenhower‘s) own fitness to continue in office
should his health severely deteriorate or if an
ailment, such as a stroke, limited his mental
capacities.29
Eisenhower‘s tactics, right down to his
efforts to accommodate Johnson‘s ego, as well as
his incredible patience which the Democratic
leader, showed how effective the President was at
managing and even manipulating what could have
been a bitter adversary into a respectful opponent
and a partial ally. And while his tactics were
inventive if not brilliant, comparatively few
scholars have assessed Eisenhower‘s subtle role in

29

Eisenhower established this committee after
experiencing his first health scares in office, including a heart
attack in 1955 and a stroke in 1957. Ann C. Whitman Diary, 3
January 1958, Ann Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series,
Box 9, DDEL.
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the crucial legislative issues of the day. As a result,
the stereotype of Eisenhower as a passive president
persists. To better understand Eisenhower and
Johnson‘s relationship and comparative powers, a
more complete picture is required. Several
significant case studies, ranging throughout the
Presidency, serve to enhance Eisenhower‘s true role
in this dynamic. Taken together, they represent each
man‘s strengths and power.
Early Cooperation and the Emergence of
Eisenhower‘s Leadership Abilities
―We are in the minority,‖ Johnson told the
Senate Democratic Conference after assuming the
party leadership in early 1953, adding ―I have never
agreed with the statement that it is ‗the business of
the opposition to oppose.‘ I do not believe the
American people have sent us here merely to

184

obstruct.‖30 Knowing full well that it was not in his
own best interest to make an enemy in Eisenhower,
Johnson supported the President where practicable.
Johnson moved quickly to extend the olive branch
to Eisenhower by accepting the nominees for the
Presidential cabinet, declaring ―I am anxious to
cooperate with the President in carrying out his
mandate. Unless there is a violation of some
important principle, I believe the President should
have around him the men he has selected.‖31 One of
the most contentious nominees needed Johnson‘s
help the most. Eisenhower had selected Charles
―Chip‖ Bohlen to be Ambassador to the Soviet
Union in April 1953. Bohlen was a career diplomat
30

Lyndon B. Johnson to the Senate Democratic
Conference, 2 January 1953, White House Central Files,
Alphabetical File, Box 1599, DDEL.
31
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with experience in dealing with the Soviets, but
anticommunist maverick Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy vehemently opposed Bohlen‘s
confirmation because the latter had taken part in the
Yalta Conference, which had yielded sections of
Germany and the city of Berlin to Soviet influence.
In addition, McCarthy implied that Bohlen was as a
homosexual and demanded access to Bohlen‘s FBI
file.32 Eisenhower denied McCarthy access to the
file but allowed it to be reviewed by Senate
Majority Leader Robert Taft, who found in it
nothing worthy of disqualifying Bohlen. On the
Senate floor Johnson defended Bohlen, and accused
McCarthy and his supporters of questioning the
integrity of President Eisenhower. With support
from Johnson and the Democrats, Bohlen was
32
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confirmed in a 74 to 13 vote. As a result, Johnson
knew he and the Democrats benefitted from this
issue while the Republicans seemed divided. Not
for the last time, Johnson got good press and
Eisenhower got what he wanted out of the Senate.33
A Common Enemy: Right-Wing Senators
At the beginning of the 1953 session of
Congress, conservative Ohio Senator John Bricker
offered an amendment limiting the President‘s
power to conduct foreign affairs by granting
authority to Congress to approve international
compacts and treaties and by restricting the
President from making any treaty which violated
the Constitution. Eisenhower did not feel that such
an amendment was truly necessary, but saw nothing
wrong with its premise, which was ―. . . a
reaffirmation of the supremacy of our Constitution
33
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and the right of Congress, under the Constitution, to
annul by subsequent act of its own any provision of
any treaty.‖34 However, the President made clear he
thought the language of the Bricker Amendment
tied the president‘s hands and ―. . . would be notice
to our friends as well as our enemies abroad that our
country intends to withdraw from its leadership in
world affairs . . . It would impair our hopes and
plans for peace and for the successful achievement
of the important international matters now under
discussion.‖35 Bricker‘s proposal appeared to be
subtly criticizing the United Nations by declaring
that it would not permit international organizations
from controlling or adjudicating the rights of
34
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American citizens.36 Eisenhower and Attorney
General Herbert Brownell tried to convince Bricker
to delay the Senate‘s consideration of his proposal,
but Bricker introduced it anyway, and signed on
sixty-three other senators as cosponsors. In turn,
Eisenhower worked with Republican leader
William Knowland to introduce what was called the
Knowland Substitute for the Bricker Amendment.
Essentially, though, this was Eisenhower‘s
counterproposal, simply reaffirming the Senate‘s
ability to ratify all foreign treaties.37
However, Lyndon Johnson soon managed to
develop a more popular alternative to Bricker.
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Johnson considered the Bricker Amendment an
insult to former Democratic Presidents Roosevelt
and Truman, not to mention an impediment if he
himself ever became president. Yet, he was also
under a great deal of pressure because most
southern Democrats supported Bricker, as did Sid
Richardson.38 Johnson, in this case, showed his
political cunning by meeting with Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, and asking Dulles to convince
Eisenhower to publicly denounce Bricker‘s
Amendment.39 Most importantly, though, Johnson
38
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convinced Democratic Senator Walter George to
propose a more moderate alternative to Bricker‘s
measure. George‘s motion dictated that
international treaties could not become law if they
violated the Constitution, and all United Nations
Charters and Executive agreements (but not formal
treaties) required approval by Congress. Johnson,
though, wanted the George Resolution to fail as
well, but by a closer and more respectable margin.
Johnson hoped the George Resolution would draw
some conservatives from Bricker and, if George
failed, he hoped the issue might be laid to rest.40
Eisenhower himself might have accepted the
George Amendment, but again felt such an
amendment was not necessary. He also feared its
passage might make it appear that the Democrats
40
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had once again saved his administration. Yet, as
historian Daune Tananbaum noted, this was hardly
the reality; in fact Eisenhower ―. . . played an active
role in the deliberations within the administration
and the efforts to work out a compromise with
Senator George and the Democrats and the
Republican leaders.‖41 On February 26, 1954, both
amendments were up for a vote. Bricker‘s only
garnered forty-two votes to fifty in opposition.
George received sixty votes, but thirty-one opposed
him, which kept the amendment from meeting the
required support from the two-thirds of the Senate.42
Johnson had apparently executed the voting exactly
41
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to his desire and received the credit he sought from
the press. What the press missed was how
Republican dissent from the George Resolution
effectively showcased Eisenhower‘s influence, as
thirteen moderate ―Eisenhower Republicans‖ voted
against George, because, as Tananbaum noted, ―of
the administration‘s objections.‖43 Scholars have
looked to the Bricker debate to prove Johnson‘s
prowess as Majority Leader, and, for that matter, his
ability to calculate votes and hold Democratic
support exactly where he wanted it should give him
notable credit for diffusing Bricker. As the ―master
of the Senate,‖ Johnson deserves no less. Still,
Eisenhower worked his own influence behind the
scenes (and in public, wherever necessary), and
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played a critical role in working towards the goal,
which, on this occasion, he and Johnson shared.
The debate over the Bricker Amendment
was only a momentary interruption in the saga of
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. As McCarthy‘s
committee began hearings with the U.S. Army in
early 1954, Johnson kept silent. He feared a
Democratic assault against McCarthy would unite
the Republicans and make the notorious Wisconsin
senator a partisan issue. As Johnson put it, ―. . . why
put on the brave act, beat one‘s chest, and net
twenty-five votes against Joe, and in turn get
smeared and unite the Republicans behind Joe.‖44
Although Democrats and Johnson approved
McCarthy‘s censure, it was Eisenhower‘s efforts to
subtly undermine McCarthy that had greater
44
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influence in slowly, but surely, securing
McCarthy‘s downfall.45 United Nations
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge later wrote that in
a meeting on January 21, 1954, Eisenhower laid out
a clever strategy based on televising the upcoming
Army-McCarthy hearings. Figuring the hearings
would not go well for McCarthy, Eisenhower then
arranged for Vermont Senator Ralph Flanders to
call for McCarthy‘s censure. This move ultimately
triggered an investigative committee which
recommended censure to the entire Senate body.
Eisenhower‘s plan moved cautiously, but its result
indicated that Eisenhower was just as crafty as the
wily Johnson.46 Johnson, though, worked
effectively as well, wherever he thought he could
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help to undermine McCarthy. Especially when,
prior to his censure, McCarthy introduced a
resolution limiting presidential ability to negotiate
within the ―Big Four‖ powers (Great Britain,
France, the Soviet Union, and the United States).
Johnson countered McCarthy‘s attention-getting
ploy by quickly bringing it to a vote on the floor,
where it was struck down. Eisenhower privately
celebrated the result, saying ―McCarthyism‖ had
been reduced to ―McCarthywasm.‖47 Thus, while
Johnson and Eisenhower did not necessarily work
jointly, they again had a common goal in seeing
McCarthy‘s influence ended, and aided each other
by both working towards it.
Playing Politics: Cracks in the Partnership
During the second term, their dynamic
shifted significantly. The two shared fewer goals as
47
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Johnson was no longer satisfied helping the
President‘s agenda, but instead wanted to advance
one of his own - an agenda which benefitted him
the most. Johnson‘s change of heart, however,
allowed Eisenhower to prove his true leadership
ability in Congress, through issues like civil rights
in 1957. Based on proposals made by Attorney
General Herbert Brownell in 1956, proposals which
never made it to the Senate floor, the Civil Rights
Act of 1957 would be the most critical piece of
legislation debated by the Congress that year. This
came about, according to Brownell, thanks to
Illinois Senator Paul Douglas, who managed to
―extract‖ a promise from Johnson which assured
civil rights would be considered early in the 1957
session.48 Then Vice President Richard Nixon,
48
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Republican Leader William Knowland, and
Brownell arranged for Knowland to bring the act to
the Senate floor directly, where Nixon, as the
presiding officer, authorized the bill for
consideration by the full Senate, thus allowing the
act to avoid first being sent to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, where Chairman James Eastland, a
vehement supporter of segregation, would certainly
have killed it. By employing an obscure Senate rule,
these members of Eisenhower‘s team managed to
advance the measure. Kept uninformed of this
maneuver, Johnson and other southerners in the
Senate denounced the scheme as unfair.49 The
provisions of Brownell and Eisenhower‘s Act
established a Civil Rights Commission, created a
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Civil Rights Division at the Justice Department,
authorized the Attorney General to bring charges
against voting rights discrimination, and guaranteed
no jury trials for civil rights violators (as all-white
juries typically acquitted those charged with civil
rights violations). Johnson allowed debate to begin
on the bill, but remained neutral on it.50 Johnson
wanted a mild civil rights act that would pacify his
caucus of Democrats which was becoming
increasingly fractured between liberals and
conservatives.51 Johnson argued that the bill would
not be passed if the clause giving the Attorney
General authority in regards to voting rights
remained in the legislation. This codicil infuriated
50
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the President, who already saw the bill as a
compromise solution. Nevertheless, Eisenhower
agreed to withdraw his support for that clause.52 As
Brownell insisted, Eisenhower had to be practical.53
However, historian David Nichols questioned
whether Eisenhower knew some of these provisions
would fail and used them as bargaining tools against
Johnson and the southern Democrats.54
Johnson, however, weakened the Civil
Rights Act further by proposing an amendment
which would have guaranteed jury trials to those
accused of committing civil rights violations.
Johnson took this action to ease the fears of
southerners about the Act. Angered, Eisenhower
52
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considered scrapping the entire Act.55 Instead,
Eisenhower and newly sworn-in Attorney General
William Rogers used their influence on Capitol Hill
to reach a compromise with Johnson and the
Democrats on the Act‘s final language, which
dictated that the specifics of a case would determine
whether defendants would have a jury trial.56 The
compromise provided that as long as a defendant
faced no more than a three-hundred dollar fine and
a jail sentence of forty-five days (reduced from
ninety), no jury would be gathered.57 Despite a
twenty-four hour filibuster by Senator Strom
Thurmond, the first Civil Rights Act was passed by
Congress and signed by the President in late
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August. Johnson took credit for the bill, while all of
the efforts of Eisenhower and his subordinates were
less obvious by comparison.58 Johnson had walked
a tight-rope between a crusader for civil rights who
would soon be seeking the presidency and a
pragmatic senator trying not to lose the support of
his southern delegation. Regardless of who received
credit for the bill, clearly Johnson was not the ally
he used to be for Eisenhower.
The remainder of 1957 only worsened their
relationship. Back in May, Johnson and the Senate
had cut funding for the United States Information
Agency (USIA), a critical aspect of the President‘s
propaganda efforts. Eisenhower wrote Johnson, ―I
am very disappointed that in this instance you found
it desirable to reduce rather than to increase the
58
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pressure of our effort [with the USIA] . . . it is still
difficult for me to understand why this vital weapon
in our arsenal would be blunted at this critical
juncture in world affairs.‖59 Johnson also opposed
Eisenhower‘s decision to send the 101st Airborne
Division to Little Rock High School for the
enforcement of school desegregation. Johnson
remarked, ―There should be no troops from either
side patrolling our school campuses.‖60 Later, as the
1957 session drew to a close, Congress appropriated
only $2.7 billion of the $3.8 billion in funding
Eisenhower had requested for mutual security
programs. Looking back, Eisenhower sourly
concluded, ―The 1957 session marked the low point
in effective cooperation between the administration
59
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and the Congress.‖61 The situation looked no better
in 1958.
Space Race Initiatives
As much as the Senate suited him, Johnson‘s
life‘s desire was to be president, and Eisenhower‘s
closed-door methods sometimes allowed an
uncooperative Johnson to act the part. A notable
example followed the Soviet Union‘s October 1,
1957 launch of Sputnik, the first satellite to orbit the
earth. As described by Johnson‘s aide George
Reedy, Sputnik stunned the American public and
fueled fears that the United States was now falling
behind in the technological battle of the Cold War.
Eisenhower, according to Reedy, dismissed Sputnik
as an expensive ―toy.‖62 Eisenhower did tell the
press, ―As far as the satellite is concerned, that does
61

Ibid., 146-147.
George E. Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency:
From Johnson to Reagan (New York: NAL Books, 1987), 64.
62

204

not raise my apprehensions [about the Soviet
Union], not one iota. I can see nothing at this
moment, at this stage of development, that is
significant . . . as far as security is concerned.‖63
However, Eisenhower‘s words were surely spoken
with a desire to calm the fears of the public, and not
out of ignorance, as Reedy implied. Nevertheless,
using his seat of the Senate Armed Services
Subcommittee on Preparedness as his platform,
Johnson brought in scientists to testify about the
importance of understanding and traveling in outer
space. Johnson then introduced the National
Aeronautic and Space Act before the Senate during
the 1958 session. This piece of legislation
established the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), a national civilian space
63
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agency. To cap off his efforts, Johnson delivered a
nationally televised speech about the need for
exploration in space, in a performance which some
called his first ―State of the Union‖ address.
Overall, Reedy wrote, ―The picture was that of a
president ignoring what many people regarded as
the greatest crisis in centuries while the Senate
Democratic leader was working night and day to
mobilize the nation to meet the challenge.‖ This
situation further enhanced the argument that the real
power in Washington lay with Lyndon Johnson, as
some Americans began to ask if this was the man
who was really running the country.64 However,
Reedy conveniently excluded from his narrative an
64

Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency, 63-67. An
article in LIFE Magazine trumpeted such a perspective,
writing that, ―‗Lyndon Johnson has the ball‘ . . . as the 85th
Congress convened for its second session [in January 1958],
Eisenhower‘s political power had waned.‖ See the uncredited
article, ―Watchful, Challenging Moves from a Powerful
Democrat,‖ LIFE Magazine, 20 September 1958, 19.

206

executive message from Eisenhower to Congress a
full two months before the Space Act passed. It was
this message which formally proposed the creation
of NASA.65 In fact, any hesitation from the White
House towards the Space Act was not derived from
opposition to NASA itself, but rather due to
objections concerning the creation of a sevenmember policy board for the federal space agency.
Eisenhower and his advisors felt the board was in
conflict ―with the concept of a single head [of
NASA] directly responsible to the President,‖ and
was likely to divide responsibilities, and make it
―difficult to hold anyone accountable for results.‖66
Clearly Eisenhower was not unconcerned with
65
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satellites and space exploration and even had his
own recommendations on the matter.67 To resolve
the issue, Eisenhower arranged a private meeting
with Johnson and convinced the Majority Leader to
replace the policy board with an advisory group,
which gave greater authority over NASA to the
President.68 With these facts in mind, and though
Johnson was the crucial force in establishing the
space agency, Reedy‘s assessment of Eisenhower as
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an unconcerned and out-of-touch president, an
impression some historians embraced, is proven
inaccurate.
A Most Shameful Day and the End of Cooperation
Eisenhower, however, was not destined to
always emerge victorious when he and Johnson
were not aligned. By 1959, Johnson‘s and
Eisenhower‘s interactions had become much more
limited. On June 25 Eisenhower had sent Johnson a
strongly worded letter urging him, in the name of
protecting the nation‘s classified information, to
withhold a resolution permitting Congress to
investigate national security agencies up to their
highest levels of authority. What is most striking
about the letter, though, is that Eisenhower no
longer addresses it ―Dear Lyndon‖ (as was
customary with earlier correspondence), but a more
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formal ―Dear Senator Johnson,‖ suggesting that
their partnership was now more distant.69 George
Reedy, for one, noticed Eisenhower was applying
the veto power much more frequently. 70 Conditions
reached a boiling point when Eisenhower
nominated former Atomic Energy Commission
member Lewis Strauss to be Secretary of
Commerce. Strauss, though, had already clashed
with Congressional Democrats while serving on the
commission.71 Although Johnson was publicly
undecided about Strauss until the day of the
69
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confirmation vote in June, he had worked covertly
to gain the support of Republicans William Langer
and Margaret Chase Smith to oppose Strauss.72
Always the master of surprises, Johnson brought the
confirmation to a vote rather unexpectedly on June
18th, when three Republican Senators were out of
town and one could not return in time (Eisenhower
dispatched two Air Force planes to pick-up the
other two).73 Johnson‘s scheme had made all the
difference as Strauss was voted down by a 49-46
margin. No better example illustrates Johnson‘s
greatest advantage over Eisenhower: the power he
72
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held over the Senate. Regardless of how the
President tried to influence or sway him, Johnson
had his own methods of persuading or controlling
his fellow senators. In the end, it was fairly often
the case that Johnson made the final call on issues
like the Strauss nomination. Eisenhower, on the
other hand, was simply enraged by the final vote,
declaring ―this is the most shameful day in Senate
history [since the attempt to impeach Andrew
Johnson in the 1868].‖74 Privately, he consoled
Strauss by writing him, ―I believe that all those
members of the Senate who voted against your
confirmation will eventually come to reflect with
deep regret upon the day they decided to refuse
confirmation to one whose reputation for courage,
integrity, and good judgment makes him one of our
74
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distinguished Americans.‖75 Johnson was deeply
offended by Eisenhower‘s criticism, and barely
spoke with the President until he received a call
from Eisenhower ―apologizing for any
misunderstanding.‖76 Still, the damage was done
and the Strauss nomination appeared to join the
Bohlen nomination in 1953 as bookends for the
Eisenhower-Johnson dynamic, as essentially one
opened and the other closed the relationship. As
Johnson planned to seek his party‘s nomination in
1960, any remaining camaraderie between the two
faded. Johnson, as the next presidential election
neared, distanced himself from Eisenhower, and the
President was growing exhausted with Johnson‘s
political games.
75
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In March of 1960 the two managed to
cooperate for one last significant compromise, a
second Civil Rights Act. Eisenhower‘s version of
the act would have been an indirect endorsement of
the 1954 Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka.77 Johnson, though,
garnered enough support to pull education grants
from the act. However, Eisenhower refused to
concede a clause which allowed federal authorities
to inspect voter registration lists and assess
penalties if cases of clear discrimination arose.
After eighteen southern senators filibustered for
one-hundred and twenty-five hours, the longest in
Senate history, Johnson broke the filibuster and the
Senate passed the Civil Rights Act. Once more,
Johnson received much of the publicity and credit
77
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while Eisenhower was the silent force behind the
legislation.78 Following the final vote, Republican
Congressional Leaders complained to Eisenhower
during one of their many meetings with the
President that they were upset by Johnson‘s
coverage in the media. Exasperated as well,
Eisenhower admitted, ―I don‘t know what to do but I get annoyed about [the credit going to
Johnson] . . . Except for this political game, I
wouldn‘t care who gets credit for something that‘s
good to have.‖79 Few statements better summarize
this position, which Eisenhower held consistently
throughout his tenure. Months later the approach of
the 1960 election brought these ill feelings between
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the two to a fever-pitch. At one of his stag dinners
in late July, Eisenhower was asked by members of
the press to name several Democrats whom he
respected and who might be nominated to succeed
him as president. Eisenhower listed Senators John
Stennis of Mississippi, Spessard Holland of Florida,
and Frank Lausche of Ohio. Reporters were quick
to note the absence of Johnson from the President‘s
―recommendations,‖ though based their increased
hostilities during Eisenhower‘s second term, this
should not have been surprising. The President even
refused the suggestion of his aide Bryce Harlow to
mention Johnson‘s name after the fact. Ann
Whitman noted, ―The President brushed the
[suggestion] off, saying that Johnson had made
some comments much worse about him . . .‖ The
result was an awkward meeting between
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Eisenhower, Johnson, Rayburn, and Harlow on
August 3rd. Meant to be another simple private chat
to discuss Congressional matters, the gathering was
marked by Johnson giving the President the silent
treatment. In the aftermath of these events, Robert
Anderson went to meet with Johnson while
Eisenhower‘s own Congressional liaison fractured
as Harlow accused Wilton Persons and Press
Secretary James Hagerty of ―poisoning the
President‘s mind‖ against Johnson and firmly
declared that Johnson would make the best
president out of any Democrat.‖80
Ultimately, the point was moot as Johnson
had been nominated by the Democrats for the Vice
Presidency several weeks earlier, but was
significant in that these events acknowledged that
80
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the relationship between the President and the
Senate Majority Leader had ended. Congress was
soon in recess for the election season, which saw
Eisenhower make a multi-state campaign tour on
behalf of Nixon‘s Presidential campaign. Once
more, Eisenhower and Johnson were on completely
opposed sides, this time in one of the most
contentious presidential elections of the twentieth
century. No other reason so effectively
demonstrated why their partnership could not
endure, for they ultimately had party allegiances
that, at their core, made them political adversaries.
The Common Experience of the Presidency
Following Senator John Kennedy‘s triumph
over Nixon in the election, Eisenhower sent
telegrams to the candidates on both parties‘ national
tickets. The shortest, just a one sentence message of
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congratulations, was sent to Vice President-elect
Johnson.81 Whatever remained of their relationship
seemingly mattered little, as both Johnson and
Eisenhower would soon face new positions,
especially as the latter would shortly be leaving
public service for retirement.
Neither Eisenhower nor Johnson received all
of what they wanted out of their relationship.
Eisenhower did not get all of his administration‘s
agenda passed, and Johnson was obviously not
elected president in 1960. Yet, a firm portion of the
Eisenhower Administration‘s agenda was enacted
and Johnson would become president in time.
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Ultimately, Johnson was far easier for Eisenhower
to work with then many Democrats and even certain
Republicans such as Bricker, McCarthy, and
Knowland. Additionally, Eisenhower‘s sometimes
covert leadership allowed Johnson to get the press
and praise he craved. Together, they managed to
share power in a political chess game for
Eisenhower‘s entire tenure (six years of which
found the Senate controlled by Johnson and the
Democrats) with only minimal public spats. Their
relationship, interestingly, would greatly improve in
the 1960s as Eisenhower became a valuable
supporter of President Johnson as armed conflict in
the country of Vietnam intensified with the
dramatic escalation of U.S. forces. Their partnership
during the 1950s, even at its best moments, had
never been close. It was, some argued, the common
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experience of the being President which aided their
reconciliation.
History still judges their respective legacies.
Their philosophies were different and their methods
were nearly polar opposites, but together they
helped the government function in meaningful ways
throughout the 1950s. This story is also a small part
of a larger narrative about Eisenhower and his
leadership. For someone who entered the
presidency with no legislative experience,
Eisenhower was quick to grasp the challenges and
opportunities it presented him as president,
including the savvy Democratic leader whom
Eisenhower had to flatter, appease, pressure, and
take-to-task in order to achieve the amount of
success with Congress he wanted. The fact that
Eisenhower learned to deal with Johnson, regardless
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of whether the Majority Leader was being helpful,
stubborn, or manipulative, said something about the
President‘s ability to grasp the inner-workings of
partisan politics. Ultimately, Johnson was a fairly
open book to Eisenhower; he knew what the Texan
wanted and how devious he was in his efforts at
political domination and self-promotion. One must
imagine the disadvantage lay with Senator Johnson,
who appeared unable to fully comprehend the
motives of the private, calculated, and cautious
Eisenhower, which was a tribute to the President‘s
methodology for governing: a popular confidence
with a quiet but powerful presence of authority.
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